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I. INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice litigation is not a modern invention.
Rather, it has been part of the American legal system since before the
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Revolution,1 and the most recent medical malpractice insurance crisis
is not the first this country has known. However, losses to insurers
during the earlier medical malpractice insurance crises pale in
comparison to the ailments of this most recent crisis. 2 Though this
most recent medical malpractice insurance crisis seems to be coming
to a close, 3 by examining the causes of this crisis and enacting changes
at present, this country may be able to avoid future crises. Of course,
the first step in avoiding repetition is identifying the cause-a task
that to date has eluded consensus.
There are three groups of professions involved in the debate
over the causes of the medical malpractice insurance crisesphysicians, insurers, and plaintiffs' attorneys. Though blame, to some
degree, rests with all three of the principal actors, this Note does not
focus on the source of the crisis. Instead, it primarily focuses on
changes directly pertinent to the legal profession which may be able to
prevent future crises.
The problem with current efforts to reform medical malpractice
laws is that the effects of certain reforms do not comport with both the
goal of reform and the objectives of tort law. Specifically, the goal of
medical malpractice reform is to stabilize and/or reduce medical
malpractice insurance premiums. However, that goal should not
offend the twin objectives of tort law-deterrence and redress. 4 Once
the current medical malpractice debate is viewed through the lens of
this conflict, the fatal flaws of the popular methods of medical
malpractice reform (caps on damages and arbitration/screening
panels) are exposed, while other methods of medical malpractice
reform (increased regulation of the medical profession, regulation of
the insurance market, imposition of certificates of merit at the pretrial
stage, and alterations in the manner through which the standard of
1.
See Stephen J. Nolan, Referred Pain: Is the Tort System to Blame for Medical
Malpractice Claims, 37 MD. B. J. 38, 40 (2004) (noting that, like most aspects of common law,
"the concept of holding individual physicians accountable for medical mistakes originated in
England and was imported by the colonies").
2.

See ROBERT P. HARTWIG, TRENDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: BEHIND THE

CHAOS 6 (2003), available at http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/binary/695301 1_0/medmal.pdf
(indicating that underwriting losses reached an all time high in 2001, with insurers losing more
than $50 million; the medical malpractice insurance crises of the 1970s and 1980s experienced
peak losses of only $4 million and $25 million, respectively).
3.
See Michelle M. Mello, Managing Malpractice Crises, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 414, 414
(2005) (noting industry reports that claim the medical malpractice insurance crisis may be
coming to a close).
4.
See Allen Kachalia et al., Physician Responses to the MalpracticeCrisis:From Defense to
Offense, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 416, 417 (2005) (stating, "[t]he medical malpractice system has
two primary goals: to compensate injured patients and to deter physicians from careless
behavior").
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care is defined) surface as more ideal solutions to achieve both the
goal of medical malpractice reform and the objectives of tort law.
This Note argues that two of the most popular proposed
solutions to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, damage caps
and arbitration/screening panels, are ineffective at lowering medical
malpractice premiums. Furthermore, such proposed solutions distort
the twin objectives of tort law, deterrence and redress. Part II of this
Note analyzes several factors that led to the most recent medical
malpractice insurance crisis, highlights the concerns of the professions
involved, and identifies the optimal goal to be achieved by medical
malpractice reform. Part III identifies and analyzes the previous
"solutions" to medical malpractice insurance crises, highlighting both
the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. Part IV proposes a
solution to the medical malpractice insurance crisis through the
adoption of certificates of merit and the use of court appointed experts
to define the standard of care for both the judge and the jury.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISES-WHERE ARE WE, How
DID WE GET HERE, AND WHERE SHOULD WE BE GOING?

A. Defining Medical Malpractice
To fully understand how the structure of medical malpractice
litigation can evolve into a more just and predictable system, one must
first appreciate the basic differences between traditional negligence
and medical malpractice. While in traditional negligence the duty not
to act negligently applies among all persons regardless of their
relationship to one another, the idea behind medical malpractice
liability is that by undertaking the voluntary role of physician, the
doctor creates a special relationship between herself and the patient.5
As a result of this voluntary undertaking, the physician is required to
exercise the duty of providing medical services within the applicable
standard of care. 6 Because the duty flowing from the physician to the

5.
See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 287 (2004) (iterating that
"[ain essential element of a tort cause of action for medical malpractice is the existence of a
health-care provider-patient relationship giving rise to a duty of care").
6.
See id. (stating that it is an essential element of a medical malpractice claim for the
plaintiff to prove the physician breached the "standard of medical care"). The requirement to
provide the appropriate standard of care is based on three separate duties:
(1) a duty to possess the requisite knowledge and skill such as is possessed by the
average member of the medical profession; (2) a duty to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care in the application of such knowledge and skill; and (3) a duty to use
best judgment in such application.
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patient is grounded in the special nature of their relationship,
traditional negligence standards are inapplicable.
Instead, for a
medical malpractice plaintiff to recover, he must use expert testimony
to demonstrate the appropriate standard of care and that the
defendant-physician deviated from that standard. 7
The doctrine of medical malpractice presupposes that the
standard of care is an objective standard.8 Unfortunately, the reality
of medical malpractice litigation is that both judge and jury are often
presented with competing standards of care by the parties' respective
experts. 9 The practical effect of these dueling experts is that the judge
and/or jury must define for themselves the appropriate standard of
care-a task that the law incorrectly assumes would be resolved by
medical experts.
B. Is There a Medical Malpractice Crisis?
As demonstrated below, some critics argue there is, in
actuality, no crisis.' 0 These critics contend that rising premiums are a
direct result of the cyclical nature of the insurance industry rather
than increases in litigation. 1 However, much of the determination as
to whether there is a medical malpractice crisis depends on how the
current controversy regarding medical malpractice insurance and
litigation is perceived and defined. Statistically, there is probably not
a medical malpractice litigation crisis. 12 While the majority viewpoint
Id.
7.

See id. at § 307:
[A] plaintiff claiming medical malpractice has not only the burden of proving that the
treatment complained of was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, but also the burden of establishing by expert medical testimony
that the act or omission of the accused physician fell below the community standard of
care.
8.
See Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective
Standardof Care in Medical Malpractice,52 OKLA. L. REV. 49, 50 (1999) (stating that the notion
there is an objective standard of care has been generally accepted, whether applied through a
national or local standard).
9.
See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical PracticeGuidelines
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 654-55 (2001) (noting the burden on
the parties to prove the standard of care).
10. See Stephanie Mencimer, Malpractice Makes Perfect: How the GOP Milks a Phony
Doctors' Insurance Crisis, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 23 (asserting that the current crisis is a
Republican driven farce).
11. Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and the Combined Ratio) Stupid: Examining
the Medical Malpractice Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1077, 1078 (2004) (asserting medical malpractice insurance "crises ... have more to do with
fluctuations in the bond market than anything associated with medical malpractice litigation").
12. See Peter M. Villari, Whose Crisis Is It?, PA. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 16, 18 (stating
that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners reported a 4% decrease nationally in
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has been that premiums for medical malpractice insurance rise as a
direct result of increased litigation and increased payouts, 13 the more
likely reality is that dramatic spikes in medical malpractice insurance
premiums are more directly related to the nation's economy than any
other factor. 14 And while the minority viewpoint is that the frequency
of medical malpractice lawsuits and payouts there from have
absolutely no effect on medical malpractice insurance premiums, the
reality is that litigation, at a minimum, has some residual effect on
15
the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
Regardless of which school of thought is more correct on the
question of a malpractice litigation crisis, it is clear that there is, in
fact, a medical malpractice insurance crisis underway. Since late
1999, medical malpractice insurance premiums have increased at an
unprecedented rate. 16 In 2003, many states experienced 25 percent
increases in medical malpractice insurance premiums. 17 Internists in
Virginia, for example, witnessed a 139 percent increase in medical
malpractice insurance premiums in 2003.18
The problem is
compounded by the fact that suppliers of medical malpractice
insurance have vanished from the market. 19 Over the past ten years,
medical malpractice filings since 1995); see also Kathy Kendall, Comment, Latent Medical Errors
and Maine's Statute of Limitation for Medical Malpractice:A Discussion of the Issues, 53 ME. L.
REV. 589, 600 (2001) (noting that though statistically in the 1970s there was a sizeable escalation
in the number of medical malpractice suits filed annually in the United States, there has not
been a direct statistical correlation drawn between the frequency of medical malpractice filings
and increases in premiums).
13. See Amanda R. Lang, Note, A New Approach to Tort Reform: An Argument for the
Establishment of Specialized Medical Courts, 39 GA. L. REV. 293, 295 (conclusively stating "the
resulting wave of medical malpractice litigation led to an increased number of jury awards and
an increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums") (citing Fulton Haight, Doctor, Heal
Thyself: Strong Medicine for Professional Woes, LEGAL TIMES, May 8, 1989, at 25).
14. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1081 (stating that recent studies do not support the
intuitive sense of the majority viewpoint-that increased litigation and jury awards result in
increased medical malpractice premiums; rather, the recent studies suggest that the spike in
premiums is directly related to the economy).
15. See id. (arguing that while the minority viewpoint may be correct that premium
increases are not fueled primarily by litigation, the minority viewpoint incorrectly blames recent
premium increases entirely on insurers' investments).
16. In some states, particular specialties experienced a 165% increase in premiums between
1999 and 2002. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 10 (2003).
17. Christina 0. Jackiw, The Current Medical LiabilityInsurance Crisis:An Overview of the
Problem, Its Catalysts, and Solutions, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 505, 506 (2004).
18.

Id.

19.

See WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC

DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN

PREMIUMS,

CLAIMS

PAYOUT LEVELS,

AND AVAILABILITY

OF

COVERAGE 4 (2003) [hereinafter "WEISS"] (estimating the number of medical malpractice
insurers decreased from 274 in 1997 to 247 in 2002); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND
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twenty of Florida's forty medical malpractice insurance carriers
withdrew entirely from the market. 20 In New Jersey, three medical
malpractice insurance carriers, representing 55 percent of the
physicians within the state, discontinued coverage. 2 1 Not only did
increased rates affect doctors, but decreased coverage and policy
cancellations affected them as well. 22 Because many physicians will
not practice without coverage, 23 the lack of coverage translates into
decreased services for patients.
As of 2006, the American Medical Association ("AIA")
categorized twenty-two states as being in a "medical liability crisis" 24
and an additional twenty states as being on the verge of crisis. 25
Though the AMA neither defined what constitutes a "crisis state," nor
identified the "problem signs" that lead to crisis, 26 it stated, "[i]n crisis
states, patients continue to lose access to care. In some states,
obstetricians and rural family physicians no longer deliver babies.
Meanwhile, high-risk specialists no longer provide trauma care or
perform complicated surgical procedures." 27
If, in fact, increases in premiums, decreases in coverage, or
declines in the number of insurance carriers do discourage doctors
from practicing in particular markets, then patients will potentially
lose access to medical services. However, until it is proven (which
empirically it seems not to have been thus far), that medical
malpractice litigation is the sole or major contributing factor to the

LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 14 (2002) [hereinafter "HHS"]

(highlighting the withdrawal of St. Paul's, MIXX, PHICO, Frontier Insurance Group, and
Doctors Insurance Reciprocal from the medical malpractice insurance market).
20. Jackiw, supra note 17 at 507.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. But see Kachalia, supra note 4, at 419-22 (noting that certain physicians respond to
increasing medical malpractice premiums by "going bare"-practicing medicine with insufficient
coverage).
24. The crisis states are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Am. Med. Ass'n, America's Medical Liability Crisis: A National View,
http://www.amaassn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html
(last visited May 31,
2006)
[hereinafter "AMA Map"].
25. Those states "showing potential problem signs" are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and
Virginia. Id.
26.

See AM. TRIAL LAWS. ASS'N, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS CRISIS STATES (on

file with author) (stating "[t]he AMA's criteria are political-NOT real" and noting the AMA's
failure to define what constitutes a "crisis" state).
27. AMA Map, supra note 24.
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increased premiums, decreased coverage, or discontinued policies, the
current "crisis" is more aptly defined as being a medical malpractice
insurance crisis. The first step in avoiding repetition of these medical
malpractice insurance crises is to determine their origins.
C. Who's to Blame?
Three groups of professionals-the plaintiffs' bar, the
physicians, and the insurers-constitute the driving forces in
identifying the causes of medical malpractice insurance crises.
Predictably, each group of professionals has strong opinions regarding
the origins of these crises. Often, the strange bedfellows of medicine
and insurance are aligned in attacking the plaintiffs' bar, labeling
these attorneys the culprits of medical malpractice insurance crises, 28
while the plaintiffs' bar asserts its self-appointed role as defender of
patients' rights and focuses on the deficiencies within the medical and
29
insurance professions that may be the root of such crises.
1. Blame the Plaintiffs' Bar
The majority viewpoint among lawyers and the general public
alike is that the lawyers, and in particular the personal injury
plaintiffs' lawyers, are to blame for the most recent medical
malpractice insurance crisis. 30 At the 2004 White House Economic
Conference, President George W. Bush announced that reform of the
medical malpractice system was a priority, claiming that malpractice
litigation is "driving really fine, competent people out of the practice of
medicine." 31
Similarly, the Department of Health and Human
Services stated that the current medical malpractice litigation system
"permits a few plaintiffs and their lawyers to impose what is in effect
a tax on the rest of the country to reward a very small number of
32
patients who happen to win the litigation lottery."
Increases in jury awards support this allegation against
plaintiffs' attorneys. The AMA points to the fact that the median

28. See infra notes 33-38 (discussing the criticisms levied by the medical and insurance
industries against the plaintiffs' bar).
29. See infra notes 41-42 (highlighting the arguments raised by the American Trial
Lawyers' Association).
30. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1080 (defining the majority viewpoint as a belief that
an increase in litigation led to an increase in cost thus forcing insurers either to raise rates or
leave the medical malpractice insurance market altogether).
31. Jonathan Weisman, Lawsuit Reform a Bush Priority; President Seeks to Limit ClassAction, MalpracticeCases, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A6.
32. HHS, supra note 19, at 9.
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medical malpractice jury award in 1997 was $157,000; just six years
later, the median award was $300,000. 33 Additionally, the average
4
jury award rose from $347,134 in 1997 to $430,727 in 2002.3
Similarly, the median medical malpractice settlement increased from
35
approximately $100,000 in 1997 to approximately $200,000 in 2002.
Over the same period of time, the average settlement grew from
$212,861 to $322,544.36 The National Practitioners Data Base noted
that the sum of all jury awards against physicians increased by 20
37
percent from 1993 to 2002, rising from $147 million to $172 million.
It should be noted that while the payouts on medical malpractice suits
have increased, the actual number of suits filed have remained
3s
relatively stable over the same period of time.
In response to the accusation that lawyers are to blame for the
medical malpractice insurance premium hikes, opponents of medical
malpractice reform point to the fact that medical malpractice

33. AM. MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM - NOW! 3 (2004), available at http://amaassn.org/go/mlrnow.pdf [hereinafter "AMA"] (citing PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., PIAA
CLAIM TREND ANALYSIS: 2003, at ex. 6a-2 (2004)); NAT'L PRACTITIONERS DATA BASE, 2003
ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2004) [hereinafter "NPDB"] (stating the median medical malpractice
payment-settlements included-in 2003 was $160,000). But see HHS, supra note 19, at 9
(estimating the average medical malpractice jury award in 1999 was $800,000); Insurance
Information Institute (III), Hot Topics & Issues Updates: Medical Malpractice, http://www.iii
.org/mediafhottopics/insurance/medicalmal (last visited May 31, 2006) [hereinafter "III, Hot
Topics"] (estimating the median medical malpractice jury award at $1 million). One of the
surprising facts in the current medical malpractice debate is the lack of concrete evidence with
regards to the average jury award, the average noneconomic damage award, the average
punitive damage award, and, most importantly, the frequency of suits. This author has chosen to
cite directly the American Medical Associations' statistics. The reasoning behind that decision is
that while the AMA openly lobbies for noneconomic damage caps, the estimations it projects are
counter-intuitive to its position. The fact that the AMA cites this lower average and median
inferentially may be an indication of its validity.
34. AMA, supra note 33, at 3.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also III, Hot Topics, supra note 33 (stating that the average claim-does not
separate settlements from jury awards-reached $178,000 in 2004, up from $100,000 in 1996).
37. Christopher H. Schmitt, A Medical Mistake, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30, 2003,
at 24. To be clear, in the anomalously large jury awards, generally more people and/or entities
are held accountable, not just the physician. See William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable
Answer to Rising Medical MalpracticePremiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 477 (2004) (noting
that large awards are generally levied against both the physician and the facility where the
incident took place and stating the overwhelming majority of claims are levied against the "deep
pockets" of the facility).
38. Gunnar, supra note 37, at 477 (stating that in recent years the total number of medical
malpractice suits filed nationally remained stable). Note that, despite best efforts, this author
was unable to identify a comprehensive frequency breakdown by state. As will be discussed later
in this Note, this author theorizes that in the wake of medical malpractice caps, in order to
maintain profitability, plaintiffs' malpractice attorneys will increase the number of filings in
order to create a greater frequency of small verdicts in order to compensate for their lost income
due to the caps.
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judgments are rising at a rate consistent with the rate of medical
inflation. 39 However, that comparison does not necessarily take into
account the effect that medical malpractice litigation has on medical
inflation (i.e. medical inflation may, in part, be a by-product of
increases in the cost of medical malpractice insurance) or the effect of
defensive medicine 40 (i.e. medical inflation may, in part, be the result
of the additional cost of needless procedures done solely for the
purpose of litigation prevention).
2. Blame the Doctors
Opponents of medical malpractice reform often point to the
culpability of doctors 41 and the lack of severe disciplinary actions in
the medical community against physicians who commit malpractice as
being the true impetus for increases in medical malpractice
insurance. 42 The Institute of Medicine estimated that in 2000,
medical error was responsible for between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths in
the United States. 43 In 1997, medical error was among the top ten
leading causes of death in the United States. 4 4 Of course, not all

39.

AMS. FOR INS. REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE LOSSES/UNSTABLE

RATES 2004, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosses04.pdf
[hereinafter "AIR"] (stating that since 1975 medical malpractice payouts closely track medical
inflation).
40. In a national study by Harris Interactive, Inc., 79% of physicians indicated they perform
defensive medicine on a regular basis. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., MOST DOCTORS REPORT
FEAR OF MALPRACTICE LIABILITY HAS HARMED THEIR ABILITY TO PROVIDE QUALITY CARE:
CAUSED THEM TO ORDER UNNECESSARY TESTS, PROVIDE UNNECESSARY TREATMENT AND MAKE

UNNECESSARY REFERRALS (2002), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=300 (reporting that in a survey of physicians, 79% admitted to ordering
unnecessary tests, 74% stated they made unnecessary referrals, and 51% said they suggested
unnecessary biopsies). The AMA estimated that between $70 and $126 billion is spent annually
on defensive medicine. AMA, supra note 33, at 8. By comparison, the National Practitioners Data
Base estimates that medical malpractice litigation jury awards against physicians in 2003 were
just $172 million. See Schmitt, supra note 37, at 24.
41. See Am. Trial Laws. Ass'n, The Truth About Medical Malpractice in America,
http://www.atla.org/ActivistCenter/Tier3/TalkingPoints[MedMal.aspx (last visited May 31, 2006)
[hereinafter "ATLA"] (asserting that despite claims of defensive medicine, physicians are not
reducing the frequency of medical errors).
42. See Am. Trial Laws. Ass'n, Confidentiality of Medical
Mistakes Kills,
http://www.atla.org/pressroom/facts/mederrors/confidentialitykills.aspx
(last visited May 31,
2006) (discussing the atmosphere of confidentiality within the medical community when it comes
to reporting medical errors).
43. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 26 (Linda T. Kohn et. al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter "INST.
OF MED."].
44. See Jackiw, supra note 17, at 510-11.
[M]edical error [is] on the list of the top ten causes of death in the United States for
1997, alongside well-known killers such as heart disease (726,974 deaths), cancer
(539,577 deaths), cerebrovascular disease (159,791 deaths), chronic obstructive
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medical errors result in death; 45 HealthGrades, a public corporation
specializing in ratings, information, and advisory services within the
healthcare fields, estimated there were an estimated 1.14 million
incidents of medical error (both fatal and non-fatal) in the United
States between 2000 and 2002.46
Increases in medical error not only result in increased
litigation but also result in increased medical expenses (i.e. when a
patient is injured but not killed by medical error, there is an increase
in expenditures to care for that patient). 47 Though there is no clear
indication of the annual cost of medical error, the Institute of Medicine
48
estimated the cost of corrective treatment to be $17 billion annually.
The crux of the argument assigning blame for the increase in
medical malpractice premiums to doctors is that the frequency of
medical errors naturally leads to a higher rate of medical malpractice
claims; these claims, regardless of the win rate for physicians, result
in increased costs to insurers. 49 In order to recuperate from the
50
escalating losses, insurers raise premiums.
In response to the statistics and arguments blaming physicians
for the medical malpractice insurance crisis, the AMA stated there is a
miscalculation in the rate of medical error and reasserted its
argument that the problem is in the tort litigation system. 51 In its
compendium on medical malpractice insurance, under the heading of
"Patient Safety Efforts," the AMA highlighted both its financial
contributions to the National Patient Safety Foundation and its
lobbying efforts during the term of the 108th Congress to pass
legislation allowing for a voluntary, legally protected reporting

pulmonary disease (109,029 deaths), diabetes (62,636 deaths), suicide (30,535 deaths),
and nephritis (25,331 deaths).
Id.

(citing SHEILA LEATHERMAN & DOUGLAS MCCARTHY, QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A CHARTBOOK 61 (2002) [hereinafter "LEATHERMAN"]).

45. Jackiw, supra note 17, at 511.
46. HEALTHGRADES, HEALTHGRADES QUALITY STUDY: PATIENT SAFETY IN AMERICAN
HOSPITALS 3 (2004), available at http://www.healthgrades.com/media/englishpdf/HG-Patient

Safety-StudyFinal.pdf [hereinafter "HEALTHGRADES"].
47. See Jackiw, supra note 17, at 511 (noting medical errors not resulting in death require
additional costs on behalf of the healthcare system to correct the error).
48. Id. (citing INST. OF MED., supra note 43, at 41).
49. See Jackiw, supra note 17, at 511-12 (stating the cost of medical error "is reflected in
medical malpractice litigation, driving up the dollar amounts of claims and their payouts and
consequently, causing malpractice insurance premiums to rise").
50. See id.
51. See AMA, supra note 33, at 57-58 (discussing the AMA's contribution of $7.3 million to
the National Patient Safety Foundation prior to the 2000 release of To Err is Human, which
reported 44,000 to 98,000 medical error deaths occur each year, and the AMA's lobbying efforts
to pass both a House and a Senate bill requiring additional reporting requirements).
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system. 52 The main point of the AMA's response to medical errors was
that while the AMA is a "[tirue advocate of patient safety ... trial
lawyers stand in firm opposition to changing our broken liability
system, because today's injured patients are tomorrow's multimillion
dollar clients."53 The AMA further stated that the current liability
system does not encourage patient safety because it "[e]ncourages
defensive medicine," "[c]reates a lottery mentality throughout the
nation's court system," and "[e]nriches certain trial lawyers at the
54
expense of patients and physicians."
3. Blame the Insurance Companies
To comprehend the argument that insurers are to blame for the
medical malpractice insurance crisis, one must begin with how
insurance companies earn the majority of their profits-investments.
Typically, insurance companies take the income from premiums and
invest that money on the float-the amount of time the insurance
55
company holds the premium before payout on a claim is necessary.
Though insurers are regulated on a state-by-state basis, the
typical state requires 80 percent of medical malpractice premiums
collected from physicians within that state to be invested in highWhen the bond market is strong,
grade, low-return bonds. 56
premiums are low; when bonds dip, premiums are raised to offset the
loss in the market.5 7 There appears to be a direct correlation between
the medical malpractice insurance crises of the 1970s, 1980s, and
2000s and the health of the economy. 58 While the insurance crises of
the 1970s and 1980s produced a substantial amount of tort reform, it
was not until the economy rebounded that medical malpractice
premiums stabilized.5 9 The most recent crisis fits soundly within this
theory; throughout the economic boom of the 1990s, medical
malpractice premiums were relatively stable and, for insurers,

52. See id. at 58-59 (touting its efforts to pass H.R. 663, 108th Cong. (2003) and S. 720,
108th Cong. (2003)).
53. Id. at 58.
54. Id. at 57.
55. While the float for automobile insurance is as short as 15 months, the float on medical
malpractice premiums is between 5 and 10 years. See AIR, supra note 39, at 4; see also NPDB,
supra note 33, at 4 (identifying the time between incident and payment in medical malpractice
as being 4.59 years).
56. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1082; GAO, supra note 16, at 4.
57. See GAO, supra note 16, at 4 (stating insurers needed to subsidize the loss in
investment income by raising premiums).
58. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1082.
59. Id.
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medical malpractice was one of the most profitable insurance lines. 60
However, after the economic bubble burst in late 1999/early 2000,
medical malpractice policies were no longer profitable. 6 1 Between
1990 and 2000, insurance companies experienced a consistent
decrease in net profits from 17.4% to -4.7% of the insurance
62
companies' total net worth.
Opponents of tort reform assert that insurers are solely to
blame for medical malpractice insurance crises either because the
economy alone is responsible for the increases in premiums or because
previous "mismanagement" on the part of the insurers led to shortfalls
in income causing the increases in premiums.
Both of these
explanations have significant weaknesses. First, not all lines of
insurance are being raised as drastically as the premiums in medical
malpractice. 63 Second, the requirement that 80% of premiums be
placed in high-grade bonds is not unique to medical malpractice
insurance. 64 Since almost all insurance policies are subject to similar
regulations, one would expect a market dip to affect all insurance
65
policy lines (or at least to affect all medical malpractice policies)
66
nationwide.
Instead, insurers are simply paying more on medical
malpractice policies than they are on other insurance lines. 6 7
Those who oppose tort reform and advocate for insurance
reform claim that insurers are "mismanaging" premiums. 68 However,
assuming that by "mismanagement" these critics of the insurance
60. Jackiw, supra note 17, at 512 (asserting that after the increases in medical malpractice
premiums during the 1970s and 1980s, premiums stabilized and profitability on medical
malpractice lines were high).
61. See id. at 513 (stating that after the economy entered recession, which was later
exacerbated by the attacks on September 11, 2001, investments on medical malpractice
premiums suffered large losses forcing insurers to raise premiums, discontinue coverage, or go
out of business).
62. GAO, supra note 16, at 29.
63. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1086 (stating that "only the medical malpractice and
product liability lines have seen recurrent crises over the past thirty years, as dictated by the
bond market. Therefore, there clearly is something different about these lines that makes them
more market sensitive than others.").
64. GAO, supra note 16, at 4.
65. See id. at 9-14 (demonstrating graphically the variations in medical malpractice
premiums increases among states and specialties).
66. See AMA, supra note 33, at 47 (noting that if economic cycles were entirely to blame for
increases in medical malpractice premiums, one would expect malpractice rates to increase in all
states and not just some states).
67. See HARTWIG, supra note 2, at 9 (estimating medical malpractice insurers in 2002 paid
$1.65 for every $1.00 of income from premiums; for all insurance lines combined, insurers paid
only $1.08 for every $1.00 of income from premiums).
68. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1084 (stating in response to the AIR study that "it is
difficult to understand how the economic link between bond rates and premium rates is somehow
the result of the insurance industry's mismanagement of investments").
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industry mean that the insurers have invested premiums in an unwise
or unprofitable manner, this categorization is erroneous. Medical
malpractice insurers, like all insurers, are subject to significant
governmental regulations. 69 If the source of the crisis is that insurers
are abiding by the law and investing in the bond market, then the
underlying law should be changed; to blame the insurance companies
70
for following the law is illogical.
While "mismanagement" may not be the problem, per se,
insurers are not completely faultless. When insurers are able to
realize a higher return on investments during periods of strong
interest rates, insurers tend to reduce and/or stabilize the rates on
medical malpractice premiums. 7 1 Insurers lower rates in order to
expand geographically or to strengthen market share by undercutting
other insurers' rates. 72 Prior to the current medical malpractice
insurance crisis, insurers were charging less than necessary to make a
profit solely on the premiums. 73 When interest rates could no longer
subsidize the loss from the medical malpractice insurance lines,
insurers not only needed to raise premiums by the rate of the
increased loss, but also by the amount the insurers previously were
able to offset with the investment income. By engaging in this
shortsighted cyclical business model insurers amplified the medical
74
malpractice insurance crises.
No one, not the AMA, the American Trial Lawyers Association,
the Insurance Information Institute, or the Governmental Accounting
Office, has precisely determined what causes medical malpractice
insurance crises. 75 While several factors are clearly present during a

69. See GAO, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that medical malpractice insurers are regulated by
state insurance commissioners and subject to the laws of the states in which they operate).
70. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1084 (stating that if the crisis is the result of a
mismanaged scheme promulgated by the state governments, then the blame rests properly with
those governments, not the insurers).
71. See id. at 1085 (asserting rather than "mismanagement" on the part of insurers,
economic strength affects insurance premiums because insurers' shortsightedness during times
of economic boom lead some to slash premiums).
72. Id. at 1085; see also GAO, supra note 16, at 4 ("[Dluring the 1990's insurers competed
vigorously for medical malpractice business, and several factors.., permitted them to offer
prices that in hindsight, for some insurers, did not completely cover their ultimate losses on that
business.").
73. See GAO, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1085 (asserting that the practice of maintaining a
combined ratio of greater than one hundred in an effort to undercut competitors' prices "certainly
adds to the severity of the crises").
75. See GAO, supra note 16, at 43 (stating that "[miultiple factors have combined to
increase medical malpractice premium rates . . . , but losses on medical malpractice claims
appear to be the primary driver of increased premium rates in the long term ....However, the
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crisis-increased jury awards, decreasing medical malpractice
insurance providers, medical error, economic decline-it is unclear to
what extent each of these factors plays in the development of such
crises.7 6 However, one thing is certain-if trends continue, in the near
future, physicians in certain states and physicians in particular
specialties may be edged out of the market, placing the future of
medical care in the United States in jeopardy. Therefore, in the wake
of the most recent crisis, the focus should be how to avoid future
crises.
Before enacting drastic changes to medical malpractice
litigation, it is important to identify the goal of the reform, to
determine how that goal can be achieved pragmatically, and to
understand the restrictions placed on such reforms by the twin
objectives of tort law.
D. Achieving Medical MalpracticeReform Within the Objectives of Tort
Law
In determining what constitutes the "optimal" medical
malpractice tort reform, one must align the goal of medical
malpractice tort reform with the objectives of tort law. The ultimate
goal of medical malpractice tort reform must be to stabilize medical
malpractice insurance premiums. 7 7
The objectives of medical
the quality of healthcare 78
increase
to
are
law
malpractice tort
through deterrence of future incidences of malpractice 79 and to provide
sufficient redress for injuries resulting from actual negligence.8 0
Reconciling the twin objectives of tort law with the goal of tort reform
creates a quandary: what type of reform stabilizes medical malpractice
premiums while at the same time deters future incidents of
malpractice and allows legitimately injured plaintiffs to recover fully
for their injuries?
As Professor Nathanson explained, the only way to achieve the
goal of stabilizing medical malpractice premiums is to level out the

year-to-year increase in premium rates can vary substantially because of perceived future losses
and a variety of other factors, including investment returns.
76. See id. at 43-44.
77. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1089-90 (arguing the goal of tort reform should be to
reduce the combined ratio to one hundred).
78. See Jackiw, supra note 17, at 519 (mentioning reform is needed to promote patient
safety).
79. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 375-76 (stating
the dual goal of medical malpractice tort law is deterrence and compensation).
80. Id.
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combined ratio,8 1 a measure by which insurance companies assess the
profitability of insurance policies. The combined ratio represents the
insurers' profitability without regard to investment income or
investment loss. 2 The combined ratio is essentially two ratios-the
loss ratio and the expense ratio.8 3 The loss ratio is the relationship
between losses and premiums; the expense ratio is the relationship
between underwriting costs and premiums.8 4 The goal is for the
combined ratio to be no greater than 100; at 100 the insurers are
spending and receiving the same amount of money-it is the breakeven point.8 5 When the combined ratio is greater than 100, the
insurer is spending more in claims, defense costs, and administrative
costs than it actually receives from premiums.
While the combined ratio determines whether there is
profitability based solely on the income/expense calculations, insurers,
as seen above, invest the premiums as well. When the economy is
strong, insurers yield a higher rate of return on their investments;
therefore, insurers can be over 100 for the combined ratio and still
make a profit during periods of economic strength.8 6 Between 1991
and 2000, the combined ratio for medical malpractice insurance rose
from 103.7 to 133.5.87 In 2001, insurers witnessed a further increase
in the combined ratio to 140;88 essentially, for every $1.00 in income
from medical malpractice premiums, insurers paid $1.40 in claims,
settlements, defense costs, and administrative expenses.8 9
The combined ratio increased during the period between 1991
and 2000 for two reasons: increased payouts/settlements and

81. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1088-90 (arguing that once it is understood that insurers
measure profitability through the combined ratio, the only way to ensure a stabilized medical
malpractice insurance market is to ensure a stable combined ratio).
82. Id. at 1088.
83. Id. at 1087-88.
84.

Id.

85. See id. at 1088 (stating "a combined ratio of 100 is considered the 'break even' point,
with combined ratios under 100 indicating a net profit (absent investment income), and
combined ratios over 100 indicating a net loss (again, absent investment income)").
86. See id. at 1088 (stating that insurers can tolerate the difference between the income and
expense ratios during a strong market).
87. Id. at 1088-89.
88. Id. at 1089; see also AMA, supra note 33, at 54 (asserting the combined ratio in 2003 for
medical malpractice insurance was 136.9 and that the combined ratio of all property casualty
insurance for the same year was 100.1) (citing AM BEST, BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES PROPERTY/CASUALTY, UNITED STATES AND CANADA: 2004, at 346, 352 (2004)); HARTWIG, supra

note 2, at 9 (indicating the combined ratio in 2003 for medical malpractice insurance was 165
while the combined ratio for all insurance lines combined was 107.2).
89.

See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1089.
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increased defense costs. 90 While payouts and settlements are easy
targets to blame for the elevated combined ratio, defense costs make
up a significant portion of the expense ratio.
The Insurance
Information Institute estimated that 40 percent of all medical
malpractice insurance expenses are spent on defense costs; 91 most
insurance lines spend only approximately 13 percent of total expenses
92
on defense costs.
However, from a business perspective, large defense costs are
money well spent for the insurers. Physician Insurers Association of
America estimated that of all medical malpractice claims filed in the
93
United States, only 0.9 percent end in a jury verdict for the plaintiff.
While 27.4 percent of the cases filed will end in settlement, 67.7
percent are dropped or dismissed without payment to the plaintiff.94
Therefore, medical malpractice claims have only a 5 percent chance of
making it to trial; once at trial, those cases have only a 20 percent
chance of a verdict for the plaintiff.
So, while some critics, especially the American Trial Lawyers
Association ("ATLA"), would like to blame the medical malpractice
insurance crisis solely on insurers (or jointly on insurers and
physicians), 9 5 insurers are paying more per premium dollar in
verdicts, settlements, and defense costs than ever before. As noted
above, medical malpractice premiums are growing faster than other

90. See id. at 1090 (stating the combined ratio can be reduced either by lowering payouts or
by lowering defense costs and noting that most tort reform currently focuses on lowering payouts
only and not defense costs).
91.

Id. at 1091 (citing INS. INFO. INST., THE INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE FACT BOOK

118 (2002) [hereinafter "FACT BOOK"]).
92. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1091 (citing FACT BOOK, supra note 91, at 118). The
United States Department of Health and Human Services estimated that the average medical
malpractice case costs $24,669 to defend. HHS, supra note 19, at 8. One reason the average
defense cost is estimated at this surprisingly low number is because it includes the average of all
defense costs, including those suits that are dismissed or dropped without payment.
93. Schmitt, supra note 37, at 24-27.
94. Id. The remaining four percent of cases resulted in a jury verdict for the defense. Id.
Therefore, essentially, of the cases that go to trial, plaintiffs have only a twenty percent chance of
victory.
95. See ATLA, supra note 41 (stating "[t]he best solution to this insurance premium crisis is
a cap on the outrageous amount of money HMOs and insurance companies can charge doctors for
medical malpractice insurance" and "[d]espite claims about 'defensive medicine,' Americans are
[not] getting the care they need").

20061

PUTTING THE CAPS ON CAPS

1473

insurance lines because of the high losses in the combined ratio, 96 a
97
measurement for which the strength of the economy is irrelevant.
Thus, for medical malpractice reform to achieve its goalstabilizing
and/or
reducing
medical
malpractice
insurance
premiums-the return must stabilize or reduce the combined ratio.
Specifically, the optimal medical malpractice reform must reduce and
stabilize the expense ratio. There are only three ways to stabilize the
expense ratio: reduce payouts to plaintiffs, reduce defense costs, or
reduce administrative costs. In determining the means to achieve the
goal of reducing the combined ratio, the twin objectives of tort law
should restrict the available alternatives of reform. Because medical
malpractice reform should not come at the expense of insufficient
redress for legitimately injured plaintiffs or ineffective deterrence of
future negligence, reform must only affect the truly frivolous suits. If
the reform casts a broader net than seeking to eliminate the class of
unmeritorious suits, then the reform would essentially sanction
negligence on the part of physicians.
III. THE SHORTFALLS OF THE CURRENT SOLUTIONS
Before an effective solution to avoid future medical malpractice
insurance crises can be developed, it is important to understand the
benefits and weaknesses of previous tactics. While each of the
following approaches is designed to curb medical malpractice
insurance crises, they have achieved only varying degrees of success.
Additionally, each of these tactics has had differing impacts on the
goal of medical malpractice reform and the objectives of tort law.
A.

Caps on Non-Economic Damages

Probably the most popular version of medical malpractice
reform since the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 1970s has
been caps on jury awards. Currently, nineteen states limit the
amount of recovery juries are able to award in medical malpractice
cases. 98 While some states have overall caps on damages-both

96. See AMA, supra note 33, at 54 (estimating a 36.8 point difference between the medical
malpractice combined ratio and the combined ratio of all property casualty insurance in 2003);
HARTWIG, supra note 2, at 9 (indicating a 57.8 point difference between the medical malpractice
combined ratio and the combined ratio for all insurance lines combined in 2002).
97. Arguably, in a stronger economy, insurers can withstand a higher combined ratio
without increasing rates or, at least, without escalating rates as drastically.
98. See WEISS, supra note 19, at 16 (listing nineteen states in 2003 with caps on damages;
those states are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
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economic and non-economic 9 9-- most states with caps limit only noneconomic damages, including pain and suffering, loss of consortium,
and hedonic damages. 100 Most states use what is referred to as a
"hard cap," which is a cap limiting recovery at a specific dollar
amount. 101
The 109th Congress is currently considering a federal medical
malpractice reform statute that conforms to the prototypical state
non-economic damage cap.1 0 2 The federal statute calls for a hard cap
on non-economic damages at $250,000.103 In addition, the federal
statute aims to limit punitive damages to $250,000 or twice the
compensatory damages in that particular case-whichever is
greater.104 Though this statute, "House Bill 5", passed the House of
Representatives in 2005,105 it is currently stalled in the Senate.1 06
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
99. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 2006) (stating that "[e]xcept for punitive damages
and medical care and related benefits, the aggregate dollar amount recoverable by all persons for
or arising from any injury or death to a patient as a result of malpractice shall not exceed six
hundred thousand dollars ($600,000) per occurrence").
100. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2006) (stating noneconomic damages
compensating for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other
non[-]pecuniary damage" cannot exceed $250,000).
101. See, e.g., id. Other states allow for a shifting or sliding cap that allows noneconomic
damages to be awarded in proportion to compensatory damages. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.43 (West 2006):
[T]he amount of compensatory damages that represents damages for noneconomic loss
that is recoverable in a civil action under this section to recover damages for injury,
death, or loss to person or property shall not exceed the greater of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars or an amount that is equal to three times the plaintiffs economic
loss, as determined by the trier of fact, to a maximum of three hundred fifty thousand
dollars for each plaintiff or a maximum of five hundred thousand dollars for each
occurrence.
102. See H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005). In addition to capping punitive damages and noneconomic damages, the House bill limits the percentage of recovery that can be used for
attorneys' fees, see id. § 5, limits the statute of limitations for filing, see id. § 3, exempts
producers of medicine and medical devices from punitive damages if the producers complied with
FDA standards, see id. § 7(c), allows for evidence of collateral sources of benefit to be entered at
trial, see id. § 6, and permits periodic payments of future economic damages as opposed to
requiring a lump sum payment, see id. § 8.
103. See id. § 4(b) (stating all non-economic damage cannot exceed $250,000, "regardless of
the number of parties against whom the action is brought or the number of separate claims or
actions brought with respect to the same injury"). Noneconomic damages are defined as
"damages for physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss
of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all
other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature." Id. § 9(15).
104. See id. § 7(b)(2) (stating "[tihe amount of punitive damages, if awarded, in a health care
lawsuit may be as much as $250,000 or as much as two times the amount of economic damages
awarded, whichever is greater. The jury shall not be informed of this limitation").
105. It passed by a vote of 230-194. H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005).
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The goal of non-economic damage caps is clear-lower the total
amount of money that a jury can award to a single plaintiff so as to
reduce the expense ratio and thus decrease the premiums charged to
physicians.10 7 The theory is that caps will achieve the goal of lowering
medical malpractice premiums in three ways: (1) caps will directly
lower jury awards; (2) caps will have a trickle-down effect, lowering
settlement amounts; and (3) caps will discourage frivolous litigation
08
thus decreasing defense costs.'
While the tactic of lowering jury awards has been realized in
states with caps, the ultimate goal of caps-the reduction or
stabilization of premiums-has not been achieved. According to Weiss
Ratings, in states that imposed caps on medical malpractice claims,
payouts increased by 83.3 percent between 1991 and 2002; in states
without caps, payouts increased by 127.9 percent during these same
years. 10 9 Despite the capped states' lower increase in payouts,
insurance premiums in those states actually increased at a rate faster
than premiums in states without caps." 0 One reason for the disparity
may be that in states with caps the frequency of litigation increased at
a rate faster than in the non-capped states. The states with caps
experienced a median increase in premiums of 48.2 percent; states
without caps experienced a median increase of only 35.9 percent."'
Similarly, only 10.5 percent of the states with caps experienced
declining or stabilizing medical malpractice premiums, but 18.7
percent of the states without medical malpractice damage caps
11 2
experienced declining or stabilizing rates.
106. S. 354, a bill with identical language to H.R. 5, was introduced in the Senate and
referred to committee on February 2, 2005. There has been no action subsequent to the
committee referral.
107. H.R. 5 § 2(b)(3) (stating one of the purposes of the bill is to ensure recovery of
"reasonable noneconomic damages"; "reasonable," in light of the purpose of the statute,
inferentially means decreased). It should be noted that an additional purpose of the caps on
noneconomic damages is to deter the total number of medical malpractice suits filed. See id.
(stating that the act is designed to "ensure that persons with meritorious health care injury
claims receive fair and adequate compensation") (emphasis added).
108. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1102 (summarizing the argument for damage caps
and stating that proponents of caps theorize that increases in jury awards created increases in
settlements as well).
109. See WEISS, supra note 19, at 3 (noting from 1991 to 2002, in states without caps, the
median payout was $116,297; in states with caps, the payout was 15.7% lower ($98,079)).
110. See id. at 7-8 (noting from 1991 to 2002, in states with caps, the median annual medical
malpractice insurance premium rose by $9,832, while in states without caps, the median annual
medical malpractice insurance premium increased by only $7,938).
111. Id. at 3.
112. Id. at 8. Admittedly, this statistic may be misleading in that arguably the states that
passed legislation creating caps did so in response to a more robust medical malpractice
litigation environment.
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Though the statistics from Weiss Ratings cast serious doubt on
the effectiveness of caps on jury awards, both the AMA and the
Insurance Information Institute continue to advocate for caps on noneconomic damages. 113
Generally, both organizations point to
California's caps on medical malpractice damages as an example of
the benefits of "hard" caps. In 1975, California passed the Medical
Insurance Consumer Reform Act ("MICRA"), placing a hard cap on
non-economic damages at $250,000.114 However, from passage of the
cap until 1988, California experienced a continued increase in medical
malpractice premiums. 1 5 It was not until the economic recovery of
the 1980s and the passage of Proposition 103,116 a proposition
requiring a reduction in current insurance rates and limiting the
ability of insurers to increase rates in the future, that medical
malpractice premiums began to decline. 11 7 Additionally, the National
Practitioners Data Base notes that due to uncertainty in legislation,
California's settlement awards may be artificially depressed.1 18
113. See Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA's 2004 Health Care Advocacy Agenda, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/7861.html (last visited May 31, 2006) (stating the AMA's agenda for
medical malpractice reform is to "[s]ecure enough votes in U.S. Senate to pass federal MICRA
style reforms"); INS. INFO. INST., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 7-9 (2003), available at
http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-datalbinary/ 729103_1_0JMedmal.pdf (discussing the benefits of
California's medical malpractice noneconomic damages cap).
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2006) (limiting recovery for all "non-economic losses
to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other
nonpecuniary damage" to $250,000).
115. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice
Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 459
(2004) (stating in 1988, medical malpractice premiums reached an all time high for the state of
California-450% greater than the premiums in 1975-prior to the cap and passage of MICRA).
116. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 2006) (commonly referred to as Proposition 103,
this statute required every insurer-medical malpractice, automobile, or otherwise-to reduce
premiums by 20% from the rate charged in 1987; additionally, insurers thereafter were required
to seek permission from the state insurance commissioner before additional increases could be
made). The AMA vehemently denies the effectiveness of Proposition 103. See AMA, supra note
33, at 47-49 (asserting that Proposition 103 covers only increases greater than 15% in a single
year and that the proposition does not cover all insurers in the state). However, while the AMA
points out the differences between California's current medical malpractice insurance market
and the rest of the nation, it fails to analyze California's market trends as distinct time periodspre-Proposition 103 and post-Proposition 103; the AMA only looks at the overall trend from the
passage of MICRA in 1975 through 2002. Therefore, though the AMA conclusively stated
"Proposition 103 is not responsible for keeping California's medical liability premiums down," it
has not exhibited any evidence supporting that assertion. See AMA, supra note 33, at 47-49.
117. See Glassman, supra note 115, at 459 (attributing the reduction in medical malpractice
premiums in California to the direct regulation on insurance premiums and not the cap on noneconomic damages).
118. In California, settlements for $30,000 or less do not need to be reported to the state
medical board. NPDB, supra note 33, at 23 n.16; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 801 (West 2006)
(stating that "[e]very insurer providing professional liability insurance to a physician and
surgeon ... shall send a complete report to the Medical Board of California ... as to any
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One reason that medical malpractice caps alone will not reduce
medical malpractice insurance premiums, or costs to the insurers, is
the infrequency with which medical malpractice claims are actually
tried. Recall that only 5 percent of all medical malpractice claims
actually go to trial. 119 Over the same period of time, of all medical
malpractice claims filed, only 0.9 percent of those claims resulted in a
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.1 20 The only cases directly affected
by damage caps will be those few cases actually tried and resulting in
a verdict for the plaintiff. The impact of non-economic damage caps
will therefore be indirect, at best, on the remaining 99 percent of
cases.121

Caps are similarly ineffective at reducing medical malpractice
insurance premiums because only around half of the small number of
cases resulting in jury verdicts for the plaintiff are large enough to be
affected by the caps.1 22 In 2002, according to the AMA, the median
medical malpractice jury verdict was $300,000;123 statistically,
therefore, the proposed federal cap of $250,000 might 24 affect just
1 25
over half of the total cases resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff.
Therefore, the total number of cases directly affected by caps is even
smaller than estimated above. Because only 0.9 percent of all medical
malpractice cases result in a jury verdict for the plaintiff and because
the median award is only $50,000 more than the currently proposed
federal cap, less than 0.9 percent of all medical malpractice cases will
actually be directly affected by the cap.
Similarly, the theoretical indirect effect of compensatory
damage caps on settlements is even less. The ALA estimated that the
settlement over thirty thousand dollars ...
").As a result, a disproportionate number of
settlements are settled at or just below $30,000. NPDB, supra note 33, at 23 n.16. In 2003 for
example, nearly ten percent of all medical malpractice settlements in California were for an
amount just under the reporting limit, and another five percent of settlements were for exactly
$30,000. Id.
119. See Schmitt, supra note 37, at 27.
120. Id.

121. There have been no statistical breakdowns to show the indirect effect of compensatory
damage caps on settlement amounts. Therefore, the argument that there is any effect on
settlements is theoretical. And, as seen below, even if this indirect effect exists, it only has the
potential to work in less than half of all medical malpractice cases. See infra notes 122-126 and
accompanying text.
122. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1108.
123. AMA, supra note 33, at 3.
124. To be sure, the median award cited includes noneconomic, economic, and punitive
damages. Thus, a cap on only noneconomic damages will directly affect even fewer cases than
those at the $250,000 mark.
125. See Gunnar, supra note 37, at 476 (performing a similar analysis with the 2000 average
jury award which was estimated to be only $126,270); see also Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1107
(estimating the total percentage of medical cases resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff at 1.3%).
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median medical malpractice settlement is only $200,000.126 Therefore,
compensatory damage caps will have absolutely no indirect effect on
more than half of all medical malpractice settlements.
Additionally, caps on damages do nothing to reduce defense
costs for insurers. Insurers spend 40% of all expenses in medical
malpractice policies on defense costs. 127 Again, caps can only affect
defense costs indirectly. The argument behind this indirect effect is
that if recovery were lower, plaintiffs' attorneys would be less willing
to handle frivolous medical malpractice claims.' 28 However, this
argument ignores both the nature of the contingency fee system and
the crux of the argument for medical malpractice litigation reformthat abuses by trial lawyers are unjustly inflating the cost of medical
malpractice insurance.
The pragmatic goal of caps ignores the reality that many
plaintiffs' attorneys operate on a contingency fee basis and must,
therefore, file more cases than are expected to result in a payout. 129 A
contingency fee necessarily means that in the event of a loss, the
attorney recovers nothing for her time and expenses. If 67.7% of the
medical malpractice cases are dropped or dismissed, 130 then the
plaintiffs' bar must rely on those cases resulting in settlements or jury
verdicts to make up for their lost expenses. Therefore, if the plaintiffs'
bar cannot recover those lost expenses in a single large verdict for
non-economic damages, the only alternative is to file a greater number
of smaller verdict cases in order to make up for the lost income.
Logically, therefore, caps may actually increase the total number of
claims filed and, therefore, the defense costs as well. Proponents of
reform want legislators to adopt a dual view of the plaintiffs' bar.
Proponents argue that reform is needed because medical malpractice
insurance crises are the result of "greedy" trial lawyers; these
proponents, however, inherently assume that after reform the greed
31
will somehow be curbed.'

126. AMA, supra note 33, at 3.
127. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1091 (citing FACT BOOK, supra note 91, at 118).
128. See Daniel J. Capra, 'An Accident and a Dream:" Problems with the Latest Attack on the
Civil Justice System, 20 PACE L. REV. 339, 390-91 (2000) (refuting the Public Policy Institute's
argument that contingency fees lead to overpayment of plaintiffs' lawyers and result in frivolous
lawsuits).
129. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing
Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 655-56 (2003) (stating "[clontingency fees
are designed to-and do-yield higher effective hourly rates than do hourly rate fees to reflect
the risks that lawyers bear").
130. Schmitt, supra note 37, at 27.
131. See AMA, supra note 33, at 58 (arguing that "trial lawyers stand in firm opposition to
changing our broken liability system, because today's injured patients are tomorrow's
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Though there is no empirical, concrete evidence to support the
following assertion, logically, this natural desire to maintain the
status quo (or more realistically to maximize income) may be the
reason that while payouts in states with caps have increased at a rate
slower than in states without caps, premiums are still increasing at a
rate faster than states without caps. 132 It is possible that rather than
losing money in a single claim, insurers are actually losing more
money due to an increase in the frequency of claims within those
133
particular states.
Assuming, arguendo, that caps do indeed reduce insurance
premiums, the decrease in payouts does not necessarily comport with
the redressability objective of tort law-allowing people with
legitimate claims to recover for their injuries. The recent trend is to
classify non-economic damages-like loss of consortium, pain and
134
suffering, and hedonic damages-as modern lawyerly inventions.
However, these grounds for recovery are well founded in traditional
tort law. 35 Logically, the cases that are going to bear the brunt of the
caps will be those cases that are legitimate and call for sizable
recoveries.1 36 The unmeritorious claims will still be viable under the
cap system; both parties will be encouraged to settle quickly and
cheaply at or below defense costs.137
Critics of caps argue that the plaintiffs most affected by caps on
non-economic damages are children, the elderly, and stay-at-home
parents because economic damages for these classes of plaintiffs are

multimillion dollar clients"); HARTWIG, supra note 2, at 9 (asserting "trial lawyers have destroyed
commercial viability of [medical malpractice insurance]").
132. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.

133. Further research is required in order to determine whether frequency of suits is
increasing in any particular state. While it was previously noted that medical malpractice suits
have been stable over recent years, see supra note 38 and accompanying text, despite best efforts,
this author has been unable to discover state-by-state breakdowns of filings and has only
unearthed national statistics or statistical samples.
134. See HHS, supra note 19, at 8:

[A]warded on top of compensation for the injured patient's actual economic loss, noneconomic damages are said to be compensation for intangible losses, such as pain and
suffering, loss of consortium, hedonic (loss of the enjoyment of life) damages, and
various other theories that are imaginatively created by lawyers to increase the
amount awarded.
135. See Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1794) (allowing for recovery of loss of
consortium); City of Columbus v. Strassner, 25 N.E. 65, 67 (Ind. 1890) (discussing the possibility
of recovery for loss of personal enjoyment); JEFFREY O'CONNELL & RITA S. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR
PAIN AND SUFFERING 3 (1972) (tracing American awards for pain and suffering to the late 18th

century).
136. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1109.
137. Id. at 1109.
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already low since they have no lost income. 138 Theoretically, if
economic damages are low and non-economic damages are capped, any
indirect attempt to limit the number of medical malpractice claims
will be realized at a disproportionate rate by this group of plaintiffs.
The value of these cases, therefore, may be insufficient to compel
plaintiffs' lawyers to take on the risk of a losing verdict. Thus, these
plaintiffs may receive no compensation whatsoever for their
139
injuries.
As for the second objective of medical malpractice tort lawimproving the quality of healthcare through deterrence-caps are
similarly ineffective. Caps will protect only "bad medicine" while, in
effect, punishing "good medicine." 140 Presumptively, those patients
injured by severe acts of negligence will incur the largest noneconomic damages; physicians committing such acts will be protected
in part for the liability they would traditionally incur. However,
doctors who are victims of frivolous lawsuits will not be protected from
the suit, only from non-economic damages exceeding $250,000.
The proposed goal of tort reform and the objectives of tort law
are threefold: (1) stabilize medical malpractice insurance premiums,
which is achieved by decreasing the combined ratio; (2) promote better
medicine through deterrence; and (3) allow for legitimate claims to
receive full redress. As seen above, the combined ratio likely will be
unaffected by non-economic damage caps because so few cases will be
directly affected by the cap, defense costs will experience almost no
impact, and caps may actually encourage litigation. Second, under the
caps, claims that otherwise would be legitimately entitled to full noneconomic damages will be unable to win such awards. And finally, the
cap on damages does not have any effect on the quality of medicine
and health care; if anything, caps protect doctors who are performing
"bad medicine."
B. Caps on Punitive Damages
Punitive damages caps are another popular medical
malpractice reform. They are often found in conjunction with caps on
non-economic damages. While in some states punitive damages are
138. Symposium, Justice and Democracy Forum: The Law and Politics of Tort Reform, 4
NEV. L. J. 377, 397 (2003) [hereinafter "Conference"] (noting that "senior citizens, parents who do
not work outside the home, and children" only have "noneconomic loss, or what we call 'physical
and mental pain, suffering, disability and anguish"').
139. More than 70% of medical malpractice cases result in no recovery for the plaintiff and
thus no attorneys' fees. Schmitt, supra note 37, at 27 (noting that only 28.3% of medical
malpractice cases result in settlement or trial verdict for the plaintiff).
140. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1110.
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capped in a manner similar to non-economic damage caps, 141 other
states propose to limit punitive awards through adjustments in the
applicable burden of proof. 142 Several states have adjusted the burden
of proof for punitive damages from the preponderance of the evidence
standard to the clear and convincing evidence standard, 143 and, in the
144
rare case, to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Caps on punitive damages and caps on non-economic damages
share identical goals 145 and nearly identical weaknesses. 146 The major
difference between limiting punitive damages in medical malpractice
claims and limiting non-economic compensatory damages is that
punitive damages do not affect the plaintiffs ability to recover fully for
47
his injuries, because no one party is entitled to receive punitives.1
141. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 2006) (placing a $350,000 cap on punitives).
142. See H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing the national standard for punitive damages in
medical malpractice cases should be the "clear and convincing evidence that such person acted
with malicious intent to injure the claimant, or that such person deliberately failed to avoid
unnecessary injury that such person knew the claimant was substantially certain to suffer").
143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 2006) ("A defendant may be held liable for
punitive damages only if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence, finds that the
defendant was personally guilty of intentional misconduct or gross negligence."); see also
Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1104 (noting thirty-three states require a showing of clear and
convincing evidence before awarding punitive damages).
144. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2006) (stating "[e]xemplary damages against the
party against whom the claim is asserted shall only be awarded in a civil action when the party
asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a wrong").
145. Reducing the expense ratio by decreasing payouts.
146. The first weakness is that the majority of awards are too low to implicate the cap,
making the effect on the expense ratio indirect at best. Returning to the statistic that the median
jury award is $300,000, AMA, supra note 33, at 3, under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell a single digit ratio should exist between compensatory and punitive damages. 538 U.S.
408, 425 (2003) ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award
cannot exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate,
however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."). Under that theory, the
theoretical maximum ratio (1:9) would require $30,000 in compensatory damages which would
mean that the punitive damages (if awarded) in the median medical malpractice case would be
only $270,000-just $20,000 over the proposed federal cap on punitives. Therefore, in at least
half of all medical malpractice cases, caps on punitive damages would result in a gain for the
insurers of $20,000 or less.
The second weakness is that punitive caps protect "bad medicine" without reducing the truly
frivolous suits. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1110 (discussing the arguments regarding the
protection of "bad medicine" through caps on noneconomic damages). Like caps on noneconomic
damages, caps on punitive damages will protect those doctors who are actually liable for
committing acts of gross negligence since arguably those are the awards that will exceed the cap.
However, caps on punitives will not protect doctors who have not committed acts of gross
negligence because rarely will punitives be levied against such physicians and even more rarely
will those punitive damages exceed the cap.
147. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983).
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to
receive full compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a
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Punitive damages are not designed to compensate for economic or noneconomic injuries; punitive damages are only intended to create a
deterrence effect.' 48 However, it is arguable that limiting punitive
damages will preclude some plaintiffs from achieving any redress for
their injuries. 149 While limitations on punitives do not affect an
individual plaintiffs ability to recover fully from the injury, these
limits may discourage attorneys from representing legitimately
injured plaintiffs where low economic damages are expected.150
C. Arbitration/ScreeningPanels
Another popular method of tort reform in medical malpractice
cases has been the use of state-sponsored arbitration or screening
panels. 151 Most statutorily required arbitration panels are nonbinding-either party can choose to take the case to trial if that party
disagrees with the outcome of the arbitration proceeding. 152 In some
states, even the invocation of the arbitration/screening panel is

punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the state,
not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated.
Id.; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 979, 981 (2001) ("Punitive damages are not an entitlement of the victims, but of
society: a punitive damages award is a civil punishment visited upon defendants to vindicate the
public interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct that violates the social contract and injures
society."); Leo M. Stepanian II, The Feasibility of Full State Extraction of Punitive Damage
Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 308 (1994) (noting awards of compensatory damages in tort law are
designed to fully compensate the plaintiff for her injuries and that punitives are therefore seen
as a windfall for the plaintiff).
148. See Cabraser, supra note 147, at 980-81 (asserting punitive damages are designed as a
civil penalty for violations of the social compact and serve only deterrent and exemplary
functions).
149. Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The DiscriminatoryEffects of
Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1005-07 (1997) (arguing the plaintiffs' bar
may be less willing to handle cases on a contingency fee basis if the possibility of recouping
expenses through punitive damages is unavailable).
150. The difference is theoretical at best. While it is true that punitives are not entitlements
in personal injury cases, punitives may be the proverbial carrot needed to encourage litigation,
especially in cases where economic recovery is limited. So while caps on punitive damages do not
necessarily limit the medical malpractice plaintiff from being compensated fully by the jury, caps
on punitive damages may make a legitimate case so financially unattractive that a jury will
never hear it.
151. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1093 (estimating screening panels exist in
approximately twenty-five states); see also Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil
Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 95, 96 (2004) (stating that in nineteen states, there are statutorily required arbitration
panels for medical malpractice).
152. See Yoon, supra note 151, at 96 (asserting no state currently makes the decisions of an
arbitration/screening panel for medical malpractice binding).
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optional. 153 The make-up of the arbitration panels varies by state, but
the panels generally are composed of three to seven members; some
panels require a certain number of the members to be physicians and
attorneys. 15 4 In theory, the goal of lowering medical malpractice
insurance premiums is accomplished by weeding out unjustified or
frivolous claims, encouraging settlement, and reducing the number of
cases that go to trial.155
Unfortunately, the goal of arbitration panels has failed to be
realized by the various states that have implemented this
procedure. 156 The most notable failure of arbitration panels is their
inability to reduce the combined ratio.1 5 7 In actuality, the use of
The
arbitration panels actually increases the combined ratio. 158
escalation is a result of two factors: arbitration panels increase the
chances of victory for plaintiffs while decreasing the costs for
plaintiffs' attorneys.1 59 In states with arbitration panels, defendants
won 62 percent of the time in front of these panels; however, in those
same states, prior to the arbitration panels, defendants were
1 60
victorious in 70 percent of the medical malpractice cases.
Additionally, the cost of bringing a medical malpractice suit was
significantly reduced when tried before an arbitration panel rather
than a jury.' 6' The reality experienced by the states with arbitration
panels was that a decrease in the cost of litigation coupled with an
increased chance for a plaintiff victory actually fostered more

153. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-33 (West 2006) (stating "[wihenever all parties to a
claim for malpractice agree, they may request the Insurance Commissioner... to select a
panel.., from the Malpractice Screening Panel") (emphasis added).
154. See Yoon, supra note 151, at 100 (discussing the pool from which Nevada draws its
arbitration panel members).
155. See Harold A. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and
Trends, 17 FORUM 682, 682 (1982):
[U]tilizing arbitration and screening panels for resolving medical malpractice
disputes, state legislatures expected to: 1. increase delivery of health services; 2.
decrease cost of medical care; 3. reduce the volume of nonmeritorious litigation; 4.
reduce the backlog of malpractice cases which ordinarily proceed to trial; 5. encourage
prompt and early dispositions of meritorious claims at the pre-litigation stage; and 6.
reduce the [spiraling] costs of medical care.
156. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1099 (asserting that "[b]ecause these panels not only
fail to reduce the combined ratio but, in some instances, actually serve to raise it, they are
worthless at best and exacerbate the medical malpractice insurance problem at worst").
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1101.
160. Id. at 1100.

161. Id. at 1101 (arguing that litigation costs are lowered in part due to the increase in the
probability of recovery).
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litigation. 162 The decline in payouts was unable to compensate for the
increase in frequency of payouts and for the increase in defense costs
required to handle the additional suits. 1 63 Though defendants suffered
a greater number of defeats in the arbitration panels, the awards
granted to plaintiffs were reduced.164
As for the twin objectives of tort law, arbitration panels, at
best, make limited headway in increasing patient safety and allowing
for additional legitimate redress. 165 In terms of improving patient
safety, arbitration/screening panels do little to directly affect the
quality of healthcare. However, the fact that medical professionals
serve on many of these panels may create a greater degree of
legitimacy in the minds of the physician-defendants. 166 The credibility
accompanying awards handed down by those trained in the medical
profession may lead to greater acceptance by physicians of their own
errors and, thus, indirectly encourage professional self-improvement.
With regards to allowing legitimate plaintiffs to recover fully, though
amounts awarded by panels were lower than those amounts
previously awarded by juries, there is no indication that the panels'
awards were insufficient. Thus, assuming the panel awards to be
sufficient compensation, the use of panels may foster the tort objective
of redressability.
However, from a reform perspective aimed at
reducing the expense ratio, the screening panels failed.

162. Id. (asserting that under the arbitration/screening panel procedures, becauge of the
increased chance of recovery, claims that would not otherwise have been filed are brought
forward).
163. Id. ("[Allthough arbitration/screening panels may very well lessen the likelihood of a
substantial plaintiffs verdict, they nonetheless ultimately prove irrelevant at best to the
combined ratio because, as a tradeoff, they tend to find for plaintiffs substantially more
frequently than do juries.").
164. Id. (stating arbitration panel awards averaged $289,000, while jury awards averaged
$412,000).
165. However, arbitration panels also allow for additional illegitimate claims to be filed.
166. See Medical Liability Issues: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Donald J. Palmisano, President, American Medical
Association) (stating "reports mak[e] clear that the medical liability litigation system in the
United States has evolved into a 'lawsuit lottery"'); S. Y. Tan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis:
Will No-Fault Cure the Disease?, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 241, 256-57 (1987):
Because it may be impossible to evaluate and assess fault in certain instances, the
physician commonly perceives herself as a victim of hindsight, unjustifiably exposed
to adverse publicity. Initial depression gives way to anger and disappointment over
what she perceives as patient ingratitude and greed. A doctor's attitude towards and
rapport with subsequent patients may suffer from such an unhappy encounter. This
erosion of the doctor-patient trust relationship extends to those physicians not directly
involved in litigation. Doctors, in general, are increasingly adopting a defensive
posture towards their patients out of misplaced or exaggerated fear. Irrespective of
whether such behavior is justified, the fact remains that the present fault-based tort
system threatens destruction of the traditional doctor-patient relationship.
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D. Specialized Courts
A recently emerging reform idea has been to create specialized
courts within each state that will hear all medical malpractice cases.
The theory behind specialized medical malpractice courts mirrors the
logic of other specialized courts, such as tax courts, business litigation
courts, or patent courts. 16 7 The basic notion is that specialists better
handle some matters. 168 Having a judge who specializes in medical
malpractice would streamline the litigation process, making it both
more efficient and less expensive.1 69 Additionally, specialized courts
would help create a uniform body of law for a particular jurisdiction,
thus fostering predictability in the law; the hope is that the
predictability of the court would lead to predictability within the
insurance field and thus appropriate premium amounts. 170 During the
2004 legislative sessions, at least three states proposed legislation to
move the specialized medical malpractice courts from the theoretical
to the practical.1 71 The 108th Congress also proposed legislation

167. Lang, supra note 13, at 307-09 (discussing the reasoning for the formation of previous
specialized courts).
168. "[I]n technologically complex areas specialized adjudicators would produce better
results: that a chemist's insight into inventiveness should be employed in deciding whether a
pharmaceutical patent was infringed; that a physician's expertise should be used to resolve
conflicts among medically trained witnesses in a malpractice suit." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989)
(discussing Judge Learned Hand's dicta in Parke-Davis& Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1911)).
In Germany, where the national spirit eagerly seeks for all the assistance it can get
from the whole range of human knowledge, they do quite differently. The court
summons technical judges to whom technical questions are submitted and who can
intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among testimony upon
matters wholly out of their ken. How long we shall continue to blunder along without
the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific assistance in the administration of
justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal
habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.
Parke-Davis & Co., 189 F. at 115.
169. Lang, supra note 13, at 310 (stating "specialization allows for reliance on judicial
expertise, which can expedite the decisionmaking process and thereby increase efficiency").
170. See id. (arguing predictability in the law will help foster a stronger doctor-patient
relationship, lower the frequency of defensive medicine, and eventually reduce the cost of
healthcare).
171. In New Jersey, the proposed legislation suggested the creation of a court to handle:
a. any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional
negligence... b. any action concerning disputes surrounding medical malpractice
liability insurance ... c. medical malpractice disputes where the parties have agreed
in writing that the Special Medical Malpractice Part shall have jurisdiction; and..
any other matters as may be provided by statute.
Assemb. B. 1972, 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2004); see H.R. 1199, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2003) (proposing the creation of a medical claims court along with other limitations on
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designed to foster such specialized courts.1 72 The intent of the bill was
to award grants to states that considered alternative forms of tortreform, including specialized courts. 173 However, neither the state
proposals, nor the federal incentives passed their respective legislative
bodies during the 2004 sessions.
The theory behind specialized courts has little direct impact on
the goal of medical malpractice reform and the twin objectives of tort
law. As for stabilizing the combined ratio, recall that the defense costs
associated with each medical malpractice suit are estimated to be 40
percent of the total medical malpractice policy expenses. 174 While
specialized courts theoretically should lower defense costs as a result
of efficient and expeditious proceedings, these courts do not limit the
total number of illegitimate suits filed-specialized courts have no
mechanism to weed out the 67.7 percent of suits that are dismissed or
dropped without payout. To lower the combined ratio, any tort reform
must limit the total number of suits, and by implication of tort law's
redressability objective, the reform must limit only the frivolous suits.
Specialized courts, like arbitration panels, do nothing to limit the
filing of unmeritorious suits.
Even a specialized judge will be
constrained by the rules of civil procedure and will only be able to
dismiss those cases that meet the standards for dismissal and
summary judgment. At best, like arbitration panels, specialized
courts may affect deterrence by increasing the legitimacy of the tort
system in the eyes of physicians so as to create a stronger cause and
effect relationship between negligent acts and payouts.
E. Certificatesof Merit
Professor Nathanson identified certificates of merit as the
current tort reform tactic with the most direct impact on the combined
ratio because of their ability to reduce the number of unmeritorious
cases filed in state courts. 175 A certificate of merit verifies that a
plaintiff has a genuine cause of action. Plaintiffs who have already
recovery for medical malpractice injuries); S.B. 3040, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2004)
(suggesting the creation of appellate level courts to handle all medical malpractice appeals).
172. See S. 1518, 108th Cong. (2003) (stating the intended purpose of the bill was "to restore
reliability to the medical justice system by fostering alternatives to current medical tort
litigation").
173. See id. (dictating that grant money will be available to states that attempt to implement
one of three proposed alternatives, including the creation of a "special health care court").
174. Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1091.
175. Id. at 1119 (asserting that certificates of merit reduce the number of unmeritorious
claims filed and that "the most effective mode of reform will necessarily be the one that
effectively reduces the percentage of meritless claims filed").
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filed or, in some states, who are about to file a medical malpractice
claim, must present the court with such a certificate, or an affidavit
from a medical expert, stating that the plaintiff has a legitimate
177
claim. 176 Failure to file a certificate requires dismissal.
The notable gap in this procedure is the reality of the
professional witness-a medically trained expert who no longer
practices medicine and only testifies as an expert in exchange for a
fee.17 8 Illinois, however, solved this inherent problem by increasing
the requirements to serve as a medical expert for the purpose of filing
the certificate.1 79 The Illinois statute requires the court to "consider"
both the amount of time the expert witness spends annually practicing
or teaching medicine and how closely related the expert's area of
medical practice is to the defendant's practice.1 80 Maryland takes an
alternate approach, requiring that any medical expert testifying in a
medical malpractice suit not have spent more than 20 percent of her
1 81
time each year giving personal injury litigation testimony.
Provided that the gap identified above regarding who can serve
as the affiant-expert is filled with other legislative devices, certificates
of merit should reduce the combined ratio. By requiring a medical
expert to certify the reasonableness of a claim before or shortly after
filing, insurers arguably should be able to reduce the combined ratio
through a decrease in the frequency of claims maintained against
physicians. Following the imposition of the state's certificate of merit
requirement, Maryland experienced a 36 percent decrease in medical
malpractice claims. 8 2 While the statistical decrease does not indicate
whether the claims that were not filed in the years subsequent to the
176. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (2006):
No healthcare negligence lawsuit shall be filed in this State unless the complaint is
accompanied by: (1) An affidavit of merit as to each defendant signed by an expert
witness ... stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there has been
healthcare medical negligence committed by each defendant.
177. Id. (requiring the clerk to refuse acceptance of a medical malpractice complaint if
unaccompanied by a certificate of merit).
178. See Ira H. Leesfield, Picking and Picking Apart Experts and Perfecting Discovery, 2004
ATLA-CLE 27 (discussing tactics for discrediting an expert by portraying him as a "professional
expert"). See generally In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F.Supp.2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(outlining within the contexts of silica litigation the conflicts that arise even among physicians
when serving as hired expert witnesses).
179. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2501 (2006) (requiring the court to look at several
factors prior to accepting a witness as a medical expert).
180. Id.
181. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(4) (2006) (stating "the attesting

expert may not devote annually more than 20 percent of the expert's professional activities to
activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims").
182. Terry L. Trimble, Recent Developments in the Maryland General Assembly, 55 MD. L.
REV. 847, 907 (1996).
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certification requirement were meritorious, arguably, the 36 percent
decrease may be reflection of the 67.7 percent of medical malpractice
cases that are dropped or dismissed annually without payment. To
the insurer, it should not matter how the combined ratio is reducedwhether through a reduction in payouts or a reduction in defense
costs. Additionally, from a business perspective there are undoubtedly
unmeritorious cases that are settled at the level of anticipated defense
costs just for the sake of certainty. Certification requirements should
reduce this form of payout as well.
With regards to increases in patient safety, certificates of merit
should create an additional amount of deterrence similar to
arbitration/screening panels or specialized courts. That is, while there
is no additional independent component of certificates of merit
deterring physician error, the knowledge that a case cannot be
maintained without a colleague certifying the reasonable probability
of negligence should add credibility to the medical malpractice tort
system. And finally, patients with legitimate injuries will be able to
recover fully, through both economic and non-economic damages.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AVOID MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISES

Two changes to the current state of the law will help achieve
the goal of medical malpractice reform without offending the twin
objectives of tort law.18 3 First, implementing a certificate of merit
requirement coupled with strict restrictions on who can serve as the
certifying expert will eliminate truly frivolous claims. Second, by
redefining how the "standard of care" is proven at trial, juries will
confront a less complicated task when rendering a verdict, which
should result in increased accuracy and predictability in verdicts.
A. Certificatesof Merit
As examined above, certificates of merit actually limit the
number of frivolous medical malpractice suits filed and, arguably,
183. As mentioned previously, the subject matter to be discussed in this Note is designed to
focus on solutions to medical malpractice insurance crises that fall within the realm of the legal
profession. The proposals below are confined to that arena. However, it should be noted that in
the alternative, medical malpractice premiums could be partially stabilized through further
regulations of the insurance industry, specifically through measures designed to keep the
combined ratio at or near 100 even in times of economic prosperity. Similarly, as was
demonstrated above, medical malpractice insurance crises are affected by the presence of a large
amount of medical error. Thus, an additional mechanism through which to stabilize medical
malpractice premiums would be to reduce the rate of medical error. While the remainder of the
Note will focus on reforming the legal relationship between doctors and patients, future reforms
should take into account the roles of these two major players-the insurers and the physicians.
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exclude only the frivolous suits.184 The two concerns with certificates
of merits can be addressed independently. First, it has been argued
that certificates of merit restrict plaintiffs' access to the courts.
Second, some claim that a certificate of merit requirement alone can
be easily manipulated through the use of professional expert
witnesses.
Critics have argued that certificates of merit restrict access to
the courts through filing deadlines and costs of the certifying expert.
The filing deadline concern is easily resolved by providing a sufficient
amount of time to allow for the certificates to be issued. In all tort
litigation, plaintiffs often find themselves rushing to file suit prior to
the expiration of the statute of limitations. To allow plaintiffs an
adequate opportunity to sue, a reasonable window of time must be
granted between the filing of the suit and the requirement for the
certificate of merit. Of the states that currently require certificates of
merit, the window between filing the claim and filing the certificate
varies widely. Some states, like Delaware, require the certificate to be
filed at the same time as the complaint.1 8 5 New Jersey, on the other
hand, requires the certificate of merit to be filed within sixty days of
the defendant's answer to the complaint. 8 6 While some states have
implemented rather complex certification processes, an uncomplicated
certification window between the filing of the suit and the filing of the
certificate is more appropriate.
In order to most effectively reduce the combined ratio, it is
important that the certification process not require action on the part
of the defendant. Specifically, certification is designed to reduce the
combined ratio by decreasing defense costs, a result which follows
from identifying frivolous litigation at an early stage. If the defendant
is required to make a filing prior to certification, then some amount of
defense cost will be incurred. Instead, the defendant should be free
from legal obligation until after the certification of the suit. Therefore,
the proposed legal reform should (1) require filing of the suit within
the current statute of limitations; (2) provide a sufficient window
between filing suit and certifying the case as meritorious; and (3) not

184. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1111 (emphasizing the thirty-six percent decrease in
medical malpractice suits in Maryland following the passage of its certificate of merit
requirement). Again, it should be noted that there is no indication in the available research as to
whether or not the suits being deterred are considered to be "frivolous" or "meritorious."
Arguably, a sufficient system with checks will ensure that meritorious suits are not eliminated
through this process.
185. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (2006). However, an exception can be made which will
grant up to a sixty day extension. Id.
186. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2006).
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require the defendant to take any action-including filing an
answer-until a reasonable time after the certification.
As for the latter concern regarding the cost of the certifying
expert, when compared to the current requirements for proving a
medical malpractice claim, a certificate of merit places no additional
burden on the plaintiff. Currently, plaintiffs must prove the standard
of care through the use of expert testimony. 8 7 To require the plaintiff
to obtain that expert at an early stage in the pretrial proceedings
shifts only the time frame of this expense; it neither alters the need to
18 8
undergo this burden, nor creates an additional expense.
Additionally, the second part of this proposal-using court appointed
experts to define the standard of care-will further reduce the
plaintiffs' expenses for expert witnesses.
Certificates of merit alone are insufficient unless coupled with
strict requirements dictating who can serve as a certifying expert. As
discussed above, Illinois and Maryland have developed processes to
regulate who may certify cases. 8 9 While Maryland places a hard
requirement on the expert, insisting that he spend no more than 20
percent of his professional time testifying, 190 Illinois arguably has a
looser standard requiring the court only to consider four factors when
making its determination. 191 If the goal is indeed to eliminate
187. 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 307:
[A] plaintiff claiming medical malpractice has not only the burden of proving that the
treatment complained of was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, but also the burden of establishing by expert medical testimony
that the act or omission of the accused physician fell below the community standard of
care.
188. See Nathanson, supra note 11, at 1116 (discussing court decisions affirming the use of
certificates of merit as constitutional in several states, e.g., DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588
N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (Ill. 1992); Lindberg v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 545 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); and Pearlstein v. Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)). Arguably, expert
testimony is not needed in cases that only settle. Therefore, considering the high volume of
settlements in medical malpractice cases, the retaining of an expert at an early stage in the
litigation may be an additional expense in some cases. However, since there is no constitutional
guarantee to settlement, only a guarantee of access to the courts, there is little merit in the
argument that an alteration of the time period within which to retain an expert offends the
Constitution.
189. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2501 (2006) (limiting expert testimony based on several
factors including time spent annually practicing medicine); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §
3-2A-04(b)(4) (2006) (limiting expert testimony based on total amount of time proposed expert
annually spent testifying in personal injury trials).
190. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(4) (2006).
191. In Illinois, the court is required to consider:
(a) Whether the witness is board certified or board eligible, or has completed a
residency, in the same or substantially similar medical specialties as the defendant
and is otherwise qualified by significant experience with the standard of care,
methods, procedures, and treatments relevant to the allegations against the
defendant; (b) Whether the witness has devoted a majority of his or her work time to
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frivolous suits, a strict standard similar to Maryland's should be
applied; flexibility creates the opportunity for abuse. However, a
strict requirement does not necessarily mean that the standard must
be tied to the amount of time spent testifying. Arguably, the more
important factors when evaluating an expert are (1) the amount of
time spent annually practicing or teaching medicine and (2) the
correlation between the specialty or field of the defendant and the
specialty or field of the expert. 192 An ideal statute would incorporate
both the Illinois statute's requirements for the certifying expert and
the Maryland statute's strict requirement that those elements be
present.
Applying the certificate of merit requirement will achieve the
goal of tort reform without offending the twin objectives of tort law.
Certificates of merit will reduce the combined ratio-not through a
decrease in payouts but through a decrease in defense costs. By
reducing the combined ratio through decreases in defense costs,
certificates of merit have an inherent advantage over caps on
damages-legitimately injured plaintiffs can recover fully from their
injuries, both economic and non-economic. The only plaintiffs affected
by the certificate of merit will be those with illegitimate claims. The
sole difference felt by the legitimate medical malpractice plaintiff
would be a shift in the time period when the medical expert is
retained.
While certificates of merit will do nothing directly to increase
the quality of health care through greater deterrence of physician
error, indirectly, the quality of health care should improve.
If
physicians are aware that in order to file a malpractice suit, a plaintiff
must obtain certification by a member of the medical community who
practices in the physician's specialty and who is not a professional
expert, physicians will be able to practice less defensive medicine and
will have an additional incentive to ensure that patient care is within
the acceptable standard of care. Currently, physicians perceive the
process of medical malpractice litigation as a wheel of fortuneregardless of the level of care given, any physician can be held liable

the practice of medicine, teaching or University based research in relation to the
medical care and type of treatment at issue which gave rise to the medical problem of
which the plaintiff complains; (c) Whether the witness is licensed in the same
profession with the same class of license as the defendant if the defendant is an
individual; and (d) Whether, in the case against a nonspecialist, the witness can
demonstrate a sufficient familiarity with the standard of care practiced in this State.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-2501 (2006)

192. To define what a "sufficiently close" field may be, legislators may want to look to the
sub-classing of specialties currently used within the medical community.
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for an adverse event. 193 By -legitimizing the tort system in the minds
of the physicians, medical malpractice can achieve a greater level of
deterrence.
B. Court Appointed Experts to Define the Standardof Care
The modern malpractice suit requires expert testimony to
prove the standard of care and allows plaintiffs to recover only by
proving that the defendant deviated from that standard. 194 Because
the standard of care is defined by medical experts, the duty owed to
195
patients is repeatedly defined by the medical community itself.
Previously, the standard of care was defined using the locality rulethe appropriate standard of care was determined by the standard of
care within the defendant's community. 196 However, as technology
increased, geographical considerations were eliminated; starting with
Hall v. Hilburn197 there has been a move towards a national standard
of care. 198
While it would be nearly impossible for a medical
association or a state to put together a checklist or a series of
guidelines for what constitutes the national standard of care for every
complication that arises, the current use of the dueling experts is not
the best manner by which to prove the standard of care.
Currently, courts may be asking too much of the medical
malpractice jury. The jury must consider competing medical expert
testimony regarding the standard of care; it must understand the
complex nature of medicine and the human body; it must determine
which of the experts is the most credible; and it must compare the
actions of the defendant to one of the two, or, more realistically,
several, expert opinions. Arguably, this task is too complicated for the
average juror. 199

193. See Tan, supra note 166, at 256-57 (discussing the extent to which doctors are adopting
a "defensive posture towards their patients").
194. See 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 287 (stating that proving
the "standard of medical care" through expert testimony is an essential element of a medical
malpractice claim).
195. See Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in
Medicine, 23 J. Legal Med. 449, 472 (2002) (asserting that tort law has always deferred to the
medical community to define its own degree of duty).
196. Id. at 474.
197. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985).
198. See Sokol, supra note 195, at 474 (asserting that the Hall court replaced the locality
rule in favor of a national standard because it "recognized that technology had altered forever
medical knowledge and training").
199. The average juror has only a high school education. See Alan Feigenbaum, Note, Special
Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical MalpracticeLitigation in State Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
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While the standard of care is supposed to be an objective
standard against which the jurors are to measure the defendant's
actions, 20 0 in reality, it is anything but objective. The method of
dueling experts itself runs counter to the theory that there is an
objective standard of care.
If the standard of care were truly
"objective," both the plaintiff and defense experts would identify an
identical standard of care.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, along with most states' rules of
evidence, allow courts to impanel their own experts. 20 1 In relation to
ordinary negligence cases, the standard of care in medical malpractice
cases functions as the duty element-an element traditionally
determined by the court, not the jury. 20 2 From a pretrial standpoint,
the use of court-appointed experts would allow the court to determine
the standard of care and, when the conduct of the defendant-physician
is not in dispute, the court would have the opportunity to grant
motions of summary judgment. Rather than allow for a duel between
experts in the presence of the jury, courts should employ a single
medical expert, appointed by the court, for the purpose of conveying
the standard of care. Though the duty owed may still be an arguable
point, it should be handled like a pretrial argument, or more
realistically like jury instructions. Just as the court informs the jury
of the applicable standard of law to apply to a case, so too should the
court, via the court appointed medical expert, inform the jury of the
applicable standard of care to be applied.
The primary critique of this proposal is the feasibility of its
application. As discussed above, medical malpractice has a long
history in the United States, and the process of proving medical
malpractice has been well established. In some states, the process of
the dueling experts has been codified by state statute. In the states
where proving medical malpractice is based in common law doctrine
alone, the switch to a single court-appointed expert can be found
wholly in the discretion of the court. Additionally, it is arguable that
1361, 1392 (2003) (citing Dan Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72
JUDICATURE 292, 295 (1989)).
200. See O'Connell, supra note 79, at 381 (noting that physicians are not held strictly liable
for negative outcomes; instead, their actions are compared to an "objective" standard of care).
201. See FED. R. EVID. 706 (2006) (stating "[tihe court may on its own motion.., enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed" and the court "may appoint
expert witnesses of its own selection"); see, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 460 (West 2006) (iterating
"[wI]here the advice of persons learned in the subject matter is required in order to enable the
court to take judicial notice of a matter, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party
may appoint one or more such persons to provide such advice").
202. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1733, 1745 (1998) (suggesting a relational conception of duty that will "more adequately
explain the courts' institutional role in deciding duty questions").
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after Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,20 3 courts, or at
least federal courts, implicitly already have the power to appoint court
appointed medical malpractice experts through their "gatekeeping"
function. Daubert altered the landscape regarding expert testimony
and effectively transformed judges' roles from passive referees to
active players in the admission of expert testimony. 2 4 Judges are now
20 5
required to screen expert testimony before it is delivered to the jury.
In a post-Daubert world, judges, upon a motion for summary
judgment, effectively have the ability to impanel a court appointed
expert and to consider that expert's opinion conclusive regarding the
admissibility of the parties' expert witnesses. For example, in a
medical malpractice case, after the plaintiff files her complaint, the
defense can move for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff
will be unable to prove that the defendant breached the standard of
care. It is likely that the defense will also submit an affidavit from its
expert witness(es) identifying the defense's version of the standard of
care. 20 6 The plaintiff, in response, will introduce evidence showing
that the physician did, in fact, deviate from the standard of care;
because the plaintiff will likely disagree with the defense's version of
the applicable standard of care, the plaintiff will introduce expert
testimony of her own. 20 7 Under Daubert, the court then has the duty
to determine whether either of the expert testimonies will be
admissible in court. 20
If the court finds that the plaintiffs expert
testimony is inadmissible and if there is no question of fact regarding
the actions of the defendant, then the court should grant the motion
for summary judgment.
The court appointed expert proposal, from a pretrial
standpoint, takes an efficiency-based approach to cut through the
probable, if not inevitable, battle between the parties. Rather than
requiring both parties to retain their own experts and share the
additional expense of a court-appointed expert, this proposal allows
the court to employ the court appointed expert from the start.
203. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
204. See id. at 589 ("[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999) (stating that the Daubert gatekeeping requirement applies to all
expert testimony).
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589
206. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (stating that the moving party
needs to present additional evidence supporting the motion for summary judgment).
207. See id. at 324 (requiring the non-moving party to present evidence beyond the pleadings
to defeat the motion for summary judgment).
208. See id. at 324 (stating that the evidence produced by the non-moving party need not
necessarily be evidence admissible at trial).
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Admittedly, this proposal would only allow for the court to dismiss
truly frivolous claims. That is, on summary judgment, the complaint
and supporting materials would be read in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, here the plaintiff.2 9 If the court-appointed
expert returns with an opinion that is not definitive in favor of the
defense, then the case would have to go forward. Returning to the
ultimate goal, this proposal is designed to reduce the combined ratio
by eliminating only the frivolous claims, not the meritorious ones.
The use of court appointed experts would achieve this ultimate goal by
reducing the actual number of cases, while at the same time
preserving all colorable claims for the possibility of full adjudication.
Similarly, from a jury trial perspective, Daubert has already
empowered the court to use court-appointed experts in such a manner.
Critics of the breadth of Daubert have argued that by cloaking an
expert with the title of "court-appointed expert," the jury will
overvalue his testimony. 2 10 Assuming this critique to be correct, when
a court employs a court-appointed expert to testify at trial, the court
essentially dictates the standard of care to the jury, removing the
subjective argument between the parties' expert witnesses. The
strength of the proposal thus is efficiency-based.
If the courtappointed expert's testimony will be treated by the jury as conclusive
on the issue of the standard of care, why go through the additional
time and expense of allowing the dueling experts to testify?
With this proposal, there may end up being variations between
courts as to the standard of care. However, those variations can be
limited in the same manner as the proposed certificate of merit
requirements. Just as plaintiffs will be limited as to who can serve as
the expert for the purposes of certifying the suits, so too should the
courts be limited in the experts who will dictate the standard of
211
care.
209. United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (defining the standard for summary
judgment: "[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion").
210. Ellen Relkin, Some Implications of Daubert and Its Potential for Misuse: Misapplication
to Environmental Tort Cases and Abuse of Rule 706(a) Court-Appointed Experts, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2255, 2256-57 (1994) (stating "the mere selection of a court-appointed expert will, in most
cases, become outcome determinative").
211. The main concern here is that many state trial judges are elected; inherent in elections
is a need to fundraise. The standard of care should be something consistent for all parties
regardless of political contribution. Though an elected judiciary is a larger issue to be set aside
for another day, an immediate fix to the problem is to restrict the courts' freedom in selection of
experts. See James A. Gardner, A Post Veith Strategy for Litigating PartisanGerrymandering
Claims, 3 ELECTION L. J. 643, 651-52 (2004) (discussing the limitations on elected judges as a
result of political affiliation and other reasons that restrain independence).
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The use of court-appointed experts to determine the standard
of care should decrease the combined ratio. Suits that are properly
certified only show that there is a reasonable belief that medical
malpractice caused the alleged injury. The court appointed expert at
the pretrial phase will act as a second filter, removing any frivolous
suits that make it through the certification stage by articulating a
standard of care for the court. If there is no question of fact regarding
the defendant's actions and if the court has a single standard of care
against which to compare those actions, then motions for summary
judgment will further reduce the number of unmeritorious suits.
Additionally, the court-appointed experts would set out a single
standard of care thus preventing any unqualified decisions regarding
such standards on the part of the jury. Finally, and most importantly,
the combined ratio will be reduced by freeing the defense from the
financial burden of providing an expert witness for trial. 212 Also, a
greater level of consistency in the determination of the standard of
care should lead to a greater amount of predictability 213 and thus more
informed decisions as to whether to settle or proceed to trial.
Again, as with the certificates of merit, physicians' awareness
that non-biased members of their own profession will define the
standard of care may legitimize the medical malpractice litigation
system in the eyes of the physicians. Physicians would no longer be
able to claim that the plaintiffs' bar will "spin" the issues to serve its
own purposes; instead, physicians will answer almost exclusively to
qualified peers.
Finally, patients with legitimate claims will not suffer as a
result of the change in the manner through which the standard of care
is defined. If anything, the plaintiffs' bar will save money if it does not
have to incur the cost of the medical experts necessary to prove the
standard of care. Removing the system of the dueling expert only
affects unmeritorious suits; plaintiffs will still have the opportunity to
prove breach. The only substantive change regards how the duty is
defined.

212. However, the state may need to pass on some of the cost associated with employing the
medical expert to the parties involved in the suit. See FED. R. EVID. 706(b) (2006) (noting that
"[iun other civil actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such
proportion and at such time as the court directs").
213. See Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An
ExperimentalApproach, 89 IowA L. REV. 443, 487 (2004) ('Varying the certainty of the size of the
sanction or of the probability that it will be imposed also affects the deterrence value of the
sanctioning system.").
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CONCLUSION

Though the most recent medical malpractice insurance crisis is
coming to a close, the importance of resolving this crisis and deterring
future crises persists. The time is now to craft workable solutions to
these cyclical medical malpractice insurance crises. However, before
rushing into politically popular reforms which may not achieve the
goals of the reform and which may undercut the reasons for imposing
liability in the first place, it is essential that those effecting change
understand the factors that lead to such crises and realize that the
possible solutions are not constrained by the precedent.
The cyclical crises that have swept the medical community are
medical malpractice insurance crises, not necessarily medical
malpractice litigation crises. Regardless of one's individual political
beliefs, the burden being placed on physicians in this country must be
appreciated; double and triple digit spikes in premiums are
unacceptable in a profession upon which everyone so heavily relies.
Of the three parties involved in the current medical
malpractice debate-the doctors, the plaintiffs' lawyers, and the
insurance companies-each is both partially right and partially
wrong. While each of these parties is doing something wrongharboring apathy for medical errors, filing unmeritorious suits,
lowering premiums during times of prosperity to encourage growtheach of these professions is correct in their arguments: doctors should
not be forced out of the profession or feel obligated to practice
defensive medicine due to increased payouts and the frequency of
medical malpractice claims; the plaintiffs' bar should be allowed to
recover the total amount of damages owed to plaintiffs in the wake of
an injury caused by professional negligence; and insurers should be
able to turn a profit on their insurance lines. If all parties maintain
the position that their point of view is "correct" and that other parties
must succumb to their position, all three professions will be subjected
to future crises.
Non-economic damage caps are not the solution to medical
malpractice insurance crises.
Statistics show that caps on noneconomic damages alone do not reduce medical malpractice insurance
premiums. The fact of the matter is that non-economic damages
awards in excess of the proposed federal cap are awarded so very
infrequently that the proposed goal of caps-reducing premiums-will
never be realized. Rather than apply this one-size-fits-all solution to a
problem the source of which has not yet been identified completely,
legislators should look for alternative solutions that will reduce
premiums, while not disadvantaging negligently injured plaintiffs.
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While the proposed remedies may be criticized from all sides,
these proposals present important alternatives that logically impact
the combined ratio, increase deterrence of medical error, and maintain
the ability of negligently injured plaintiffs to recover fully. Whether
legislative decisionmaking gravitates towards the proposed reforms
herein or any other tactic for reform, it is essential that legislators
focus on these three criteria: how the reform will affect the combined
ratio, whether the reform will increase the quality of healthcare
through deterrence of medical error, and whether the reform affects
the ability of potential plaintiffs to recover fully for their injuries.
Finally, the proposed solutions--certificates of merit and court
appointed experts to define the standard of care-are less drastic
reforms than non-economic damage caps and may actually achieve the
goal of medical malpractice reform, and not undermine the twin
objectives of tort law. The use of certificates of merit and court
appointed experts will reduce defense costs by decreasing the expenses
associated with expert testimony and by providing additional
opportunities for the court to filter out frivolous claims. At the same
time, the proposed solutions may increase deterrence of medical error
by legitimizing the medical malpractice system in the minds of
physicians. Most importantly though, plaintiffs who are injured by
breaches of the standard of care will be able to recover for all of their
injuries.
Kyle Miller*
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